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Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol documents what many believed to be impossible: negotiators for many of the world's countries agreed on emissions targets for the early part of the 21 st century. The protocol commits the Annex I countries to reduce their aggregate CO 2 equivalent emissions by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in the period 2008 to 2012. 1 The agreement reflects wide differences in the willingness to accept emissions constraints:
developing countries refused any commitment while the European Union (EU) at the other end agreed to an 8% overall reduction. The burden sharing negotiations subsequently continued at the EU level when the member states distributed the EU constraint internally. Table 1 shows that the country-specific targets within the EU bubble range from a 28%
reduction for Luxembourg to a 27% increase for Portugal.
Does the EU bubble imply a "fair" distribution of the burden across EU member states? Economic analysis may inform this debate by translating the emissions constraints into estimates for welfare costs. The cost estimate for a given country will obviously depend on its current economic structure, such as the efficiency of the installed energy consuming technologies, the fuel mix, and trade relations with other countries. Differences in the starting point for each country may imply that the same proportional cutback results in high costs in one country and low costs in another.
The expected distribution of costs also depends on differences in the future economic development across countries. That is, the cost estimates will depend on Business-as-Usual (BaU) projections for GDP, populations, energy efficiency improvements, fuel prices, etc.
High economic growth, for example, leads by itself to high energy demands and emissions.
This would increase the effective abatement requirement as the Kyoto targets refer to 1990 emissions levels and higher economic growth will therefore imply higher total abatement costs.
We analyze the agreement on differentiated CO 2 abatement within the EU using the Conventional Wisdom (CW) scenario in European Commission [1996] as the BaU projection. We estimate both the total costs and the distribution of costs across EU member states and evaluate the main assumptions in the BaU projections. Specifically, we focus on the assumptions about non-uniform efficiency improvements and fuel shifting embodied in the CW baseline. Finally, we analyze the consequences of uniform abatement targets across the EU for total costs and the distribution of these costs.
The literature has surprisingly little to say about these issues. Most modelers are typically careful in specifying their BaU assumptions but they rarely report results from sensitivity analyses.
A couple of articles have reported results from the GEM-E3 model of analyses of carbon abatement in 11 EU member states. Conrad and Schmidt [1998a] find that a 10% reduction in CO 2 emissions from the EU implies an overall welfare loss of around 0.24% of GDP when each country has to reduce emissions by 10%. Country-specific welfare effects range from a 0.06% gain in Portugal to a 0.55% loss in Denmark. Permit prices for CO 2 range from US$10 per ton in Greece to US$47 in Denmark (assuming that ECU1 = US$1 Second, the CW baseline embodies significant fuel shifting in electricity production in all countries and high efficiency gains in the Northern European countries. These assumptions imply large decreases in CO 2 intensity and therefore low effective abatement requirements compared with our alternative baseline of uniform growth in energy efficiency 5 The EU targets for the six countries amount to an average emissions cutback of 11%. 6 The six selected countries also emit roughly 80% of EU emissions in 2010 in the projections reported below.
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of 1% per annum. With the latter baseline, total costs double and the range of costs changes from a low of 0.1% in Spain to a high of 2.2% in Denmark. The uniform baseline lowers the overall level of energy efficiency gains, and CO 2 tax rates therefore increase in all countries.
The North experiences the largest decreases in energy efficiency and therefore also the largest increases in CO 2 tax rates.
Finally, we find that uniform abatement targets within the EU have a small impact on total costs, holding total EU abatement constant. The distribution of costs changes, however.
Spain and France would suffer large economic losses as their abatement targets change from +15% and 0%, respectively, to -11%. 5 Uniform targets increase costs for Spain and France, while Denmark and Germany reduce their total abatement costs by around 50%. This scenario, although politically unrealistic, illustrates the size of the implicit transfers involved in the burden sharing negotiations.
Section 2 discusses the CW baseline for future energy markets. Section 3 describes our model and the steps involved in calibrating it to the CW baseline. Section 4 defines our policy scenarios and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
Baseline Energy Market Projections
EU member states differ significantly with respect to CO 2 characteristics. Table 2 presents summary statistics revealing the main differences. It focuses on the six countries in our model and shows that the selected countries jointly account for more than 80% of EU GDP and aggregate EU CO 2 emissions in 1990. 6 The sector contributing most to CO 2 emissions is electricity, whose fuel mix differs significantly across countries. A large share 7 See European Commission [1996; p.48-54] for the complete description of this scenario.
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of nuclear-based electricity results in France having a very low CO 2 intensity (ton of CO 2 per GWh), whereas large shares of coal-based electricity implies higher intensities in Denmark and Germany. Finally, the rich Northern European countries also have the highest emissions per capita.
What happens to economic growth, energy prices, and CO 2 emissions without climate policy? Cost estimates for the Kyoto commitments crucially depend on answers to this question. CO 2 emissions are directly linked to the combustion of fossil fuels, so it follows that baseline projections of the development of the energy system play a key role in the design of the abatement policies. In particular, projections for energy efficiency improvements and the fuel mix in electricity generation are crucial for the reference level of CO 2 emissions.
The CW scenario in European Commission [1996] suggests how energy markets in
Europe might evolve if current policies remain in place. 7 The assumptions of the CW scenario include smooth increases in world energy prices, no changes in current energy taxes, limited penetration of more efficient supply technologies, and no changes in energy market regulation. Renewable, CO 2 free, energy production increases its share in total energy supply but fossil fuels continue to be the main source of energy. Gas and oil consumption increase, whereas the use of nuclear fuels and coal slowly decreases. Table 3 summarizes the CW baseline with respect to economic growth, the development of CO 2 emissions, and the fossil fuel mix in thermal electricity generation.
France and the CO 2 intensive Northern European countries experience the largest decreases in the CO 2 intensity. Table 4 shows an increase of 6% in total CO 2 emissions between 1990 and 2010 for the six EU countries covered by our model. GDP increases by around 50% in the same period, i.e., the CW embodies a strong decoupling of growth in GDP and CO 2 emissions. The fuel shifting described above and significant efficiency improvements account for this result. Section D in Table 3 focuses on the electricity sector where the emissions intensity decreases significantly due to fuel shifting from coal to gas.
Analytical Framework and Baseline Calibration
This section presents the main characteristics of a recursively-dynamic multi-sector model of the six EU countries. We also discuss the representation of the CW scenario as our baseline and the subsequent sensitivity analysis of the BaU assumptions.
The model is a dynamic extension of a previous static model designed to investigate the economic implications of alternative CO 2 abatement strategies for the European Union.
8 Table 5 gives an overview of the regional and sectoral dis-aggregation of the current model.
The choice of sectors and regions captures key dimensions in the analysis of CO 2 abatement such as differences in CO 2 -intensity across sectors, energy goods, and bilateral trade.
Appendix A provides an algebraic documentation of the model.
We have developed an explicitly dynamic model to incorporate the time paths for GDP, CO 2 emissions, energy prices, etc., for the CW scenario. We assume constant, regionspecific marginal propensities to save consistent with a growth rate of 2% per year in all countries. The path for the economy is represented by a set of connected equilibria where the current period's saving augments capital stocks in the next period. Consumers allocate income between present and future consumption subject to a fixed marginal propensity to 9 See appendix B for details of the calibration procedure.
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save and investment adjusts passively to savings. The intra-period model corresponds to the previous static model. Base year data determine the parameters of the functional forms from a given set of quantities, prices and benchmark elasticities.
A simple calibration of the model along the time path would typically involve calibration to a steady-state where all physical quantities (including CO 2 emissions) grow at an exogenous uniform rate while relative prices remain unchanged. The virtue of a steadystate baseline is that it provides a transparent reference path for the evaluation of policy interference: any structural change in the counterfactual can be attributed to the new policy.
In the present analysis we want to incorporate exogenous information from the CW baseline on non-uniform growth rates in GDP, fossil fuel production, fuel mixes in electricity generation, changes in world market energy prices and CO 2 emission profiles. The calibration procedure involves two steps. 9 First, we scale factor endowments, fuel demands in electricity production and world market energy prices. Second, we incorporate autonomous energy efficiency improvements (AEEI) to match the aggregate emissions profiles. AEEI represents energy efficiency improvements in addition to energy demand reductions caused by changes in energy prices. The European Commission [1996] mentions research or changes in public standards as sources of efficiency improvements.
After the calibration the model represents the CW baseline as an equilibrium solution. Figure 1 shows the CW CO 2 emissions profile with an alternative BaU path labeled LOW_AEEI. The latter deviates from CW only with respect to the assumption about AEEI and exogenous fuel shifting in the electricity sector. In the LOW_AEEI baseline we solve the model with all AEEI equal to 1% p.a. and let relative prices determine the fuel mix in the 10 A poll of 22 experts reported in Manne and Richels [1994] We do not regard the LOW_AEEI baseline as more realistic than the CW baseline that is based on a compilation of detailed country studies. Rather we think of it as a sensitivity analysis that illustrates the implications of the CW assumptions about relatively high values for AEEI and fuel shifting in electricity generation.
Scenario Definitions
Our numerical analysis distinguishes three CO 2 abatement scenarios: KYOTO, UNIFORM, and HIGH_BAU. The KYOTO scenario implements the EU agreement on differentiated emissions reductions that distributes the 8% Kyoto commitment by the EU across member states. 11 The KYOTO scenario, which employs the CW baseline as the BaU, represents our base case.
The differentiated cutbacks amount to an average reduction of 11% for the six countries in our model. The UNIFORM scenario requires all six countries to reduce emissions uniformly by 11% and it also uses the CW baseline. This scenario allows us to analyze the implications of the differentiated cutbacks, holding total EU emissions constant.
In the HIGH_BAU scenario we apply the differentiated cutbacks used in the KYOTO scenario but employ different BaU assumptions: All AEEI equal 1% p.a. and relative prices determine the fuel mix in electricity production, i.e., the LOW_AEEI baseline.
The last three columns in Table 4 show the effective abatement requirements in 2010 in the three scenarios. As expected, the choice of baseline has a considerable impact on the required abatement effort.
Several characteristics are common to all three scenarios. First, all scenarios result in the same aggregate CO 2 abatement for the six EU countries in the model. We ignore the issue of carbon leakage and we thus assume that the EU policies do not lead to higher emissions outside the EU. This allows us to compare the results without considering the benefits from CO 2 abatement, i.e., we only consider the gross costs.
Second, we use the same cutback profile for aggregate EU emissions in all scenarios. 
Results
The effective emissions targets provide the starting point for the interpretation of the results (see Table 4 ) and we begin with our base case, the KYOTO scenario. 
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Southern countries. These countries therefore experience the highest tax rates. Figure 3 shows that total EU costs increase marginally in the UNIFORM scenario, but the cost distribution changes dramatically. Compared to the KYOTO scenario, the costs for Denmark and Germany decrease by around 50% whereas the costs increase in all Southern countries. Spain jumps from virtually zero costs to a 0.9% consumption loss. While this scenario may be politically irrelevant, it shows the implicit transfers involved in the negotiations about the EU bubble. Total EU emissions are identical in the KYOTO and the UNIFORM scenarios but the distribution of emissions allowance differs. The larger the allowance, the lower the carbon tax rate and the smaller the efficiency cost.
Both the KYOTO and the UNIFORM scenarios use the CW baseline. The
LOW_AEEI baseline in Figure 1 shows that baseline emissions exceed CW emissions by 14% of 1990 emissions when AEEI equals 1% p.a. and relative prices determine the fuel mix in electricity production. The last column in Table 4 shows that the EU commitment in Kyoto now requires an effective total cutbacks of 26% compared with the LOW_AEEI baseline. The effective targets increase for all countries and the Northern countries experience the highest increases. Figure 5 shows, as expected, that higher carbon taxes follow the more stringent targets in the HIGH_BAU scenario. Tax rates increase between 50 and 100% for all countries except Italy. 12 The higher rates cause higher consumption losses in all countries and increase the range of costs from 0.1% in Spain to 2.2% in Denmark. Put differently, if the optimistic CW baseline fails to materialize and future European energy markets develop more uniformly, the differentiated targets will imply a less equitable distribution of abatement 13 The tables with results are available from the authors.
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costs.
Finally, we relax the assumption about no trade in emissions across countries.
Specifically, we assume that all six countries can trade emissions freely such that the same carbon tax rate applies in all countries. The quantitative effects of this change turns out to be small and we thus conclude that our results are robust with respect to the assumption about emissions trading.
In our model, trade in emissions leads to equalization of the domestic carbon tax rates and this influences the results via two channels: the distortionary effects of carbon taxes change and the values of the emission endowments change. Countries that previously had carbon tax rates below the new common tax rate will experience higher distortionary costs from higher carbon tax rates but they will also find their emission endowments more valuable. Conversely, countries with high carbon tax rates will have lower distortionary costs but also lower carbon tax revenues. Emissions trading may also change the international incidence of carbon taxes as the burden of the taxes in a given country now get shifted differently to foreign and domestic agents.
We use the model to trace all these effects and the main results can be summarized as follows. 13 First, some countries gain slightly, others experience small losses and the overall EU costs decrease marginally. That is, trading within the EU imply small total costs' savings.
Intuitively, the differences in carbon tax rates before we allow for trading are significant but not large, and this effectively limits the extent of emissions trading. Spain, a net exporter, and Germany, a net importer, gain most from emissions trading. Second, we also conclude that our results regarding energy market projections are robust. We find that the effects of changing projections are similar to the no trading case, although the effects mostly are quantitatively smaller. Finally, uniform abatement targets continue to show large implicit transfers from Northern European member states to Southern member states. This result hold although the differences in consumption losses decrease between differentiated and uniform abatement targets.
Concluding Remarks
Burden sharing dominates the climate policy negotiations since the participating countries must view the expected distribution of costs as "fair" in order for them to be politically acceptable. Negotiators point to both the countries' current economic structure and projections for the future economic development when they propose "fair" abatement targets.
We have analyzed the EU agreement on differentiated greenhouse gas abatement with a particular focus on the role of baseline projections for future energy markets. We used a dynamic multi-sector, multi-region general equilibrium model for the EU. The following insights emerge from our policy simulations:
(i) The overall costs of the EU bubble following its Kyoto commitment are low when we use the CW scenario provided by the European Commission as the baseline. The range of costs across member states is narrow, and the necessary CO 2 taxes in the year 2010 are below US$100 per ton CO 2 in all countries.
(ii) The CW baseline implies significant fuel shifting in electricity generation and large energy efficiency improvements by historical standards. If the projected, strong decoupling of GDP growth and CO 2 fails to materialize, both the overall CO 2 abatement costs and the range of costs across member states may increase significantly.
(iii) Uniform abatement hardly increases total costs but it changes the cost distribution between countries considerably. We show that the EU bubble implicitly involves large economic transfers from the Northern European member states to the Southern European member states. This may be consistent with a higher willingness to pay for emissions reductions in the Northern countries.
Finally, we close with a caveat. Our model captures important aspects of bilateral trade and energy consumption in the EU. It is nonetheless a crude approximation of the real world's technologies, preferences, factor endowments, etc., and we therefore caution against too literal an interpretation of the numerical results.
Appendix A
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for the model. First, we present the main assumptions of the model and introduce notation. We then present the algebraic model.
Nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions characterize the use of inputs in production and all production exhibits non-increasing returns to scale. Goods are produced with capital, labor, energy, and materials and all sectors produce a single. We therefore use 'goods' and 'sectors' interchangeably. Firms behave competitively and all markets are perfectly competitive.
A representative agent (RA) in each region is endowed with three primary factors:
natural resources (used for fossil fuel production), labor and initial stock of capital. Nested CES functions characterize consumption by the RA (final demand) and the RA has myopic expectations, i.e., he is not forward-looking. The supplies of labor and natural resources are exogenous and labor and capital can move freely across sectors within each region but cannot move between regions. Natural resources are sector specific.
All goods, except coal, crude oil and gas, are differentiated by region of origin.
Constant elasticity of transformation functions characterize the differentiation of production between production for the domestic markets and the export markets. Regarding imports, nested CES functions characterize the choice between imported and domestic varieties of the same good (Armington).
The rest of the world is represented with horizontal export demand and import supply schedules, i.e., the EU regions behave as a small open economy. The balance of payments for each region with respect to the rest of the world is exogenous.
A constant marginal propensity to save characterizes the RA's allocation of income between savings, i.e., investments and current consumption. Investments begin to provide capital services one period after installation and the capital stock depreciates at a constant rate. Growth augments the labor endowment at a constant rate.
Finally, lump sum transfers finance the exogenous government demands and the government in each region transfers all carbon tax revenues to the RA in the region.
The myopic expectations imply that the economies effectively reduce to a set of connected equilibria, where the current period's investments augments the capital stock in the next period. That is, all equilibrium conditions are strictly intra-period and we can thus omit time indices with out loss of generality.
We characterize the model with two classes of equilibrium conditions: zero profit conditions and market clearance conditions. The former determines activity levels and the latter determines price levels. Tables A.1 and A.2 show the activity and the price levels in the model and Table A .3 explains the set notation.
The algebraic exposition of the model begins with the profit functions. We then derive the market clearance conditions by exploiting Shephard's lemma: differentiation of the profit functions with respect to input and output prices yields compensated demand and supply functions. The exposition and our empirical implementation uses calibrated CES functions as the key element. Tables A.4-A.6 explain the notation for the calibrated model parameters.
Zero profit conditions:
1. Production of goods except fossil fuels:
2. Production of fossil fuels:
3. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
4. Armington aggregate except fossil fuels: 6. Aggregate imports across import regions except fossil fuels: 
15.Sector specific energy aggregate:
16.Import aggregate except fossil fuels:
17.Armington aggregate:
18.Household consumption: 
Government output:
G r G r
Appendix B
This appendix describes the calibration of our model to the CW baseline. In two steps, we incorporate exogenous information on non-uniform growth rates in GDP, fossil fuel production, fuel mixes in electricity generation, changes in world market energy prices and CO 2 emission profiles.
First, we fix the time profile of fossil fuel supplies from the EU to the exogenous baseline projections by making supplies inelastic and scaling sector-specific resources with the exogenous growth rates in fossil fuel production. This allows us to partially control the emission profile from the supply side (except the effects of imported fuels). On the demand side, we incorporate AEEI on the energy demands by consumers and production activities.
We also incorporate exogenous fuel shifting in the electricity sector and exogenous, regionspecific GDP growth rates determine the size of labor endowments. Finally, we adjust import demand and export supply functions with respect to the rest of the world to account for exogenous changes in world market energy prices. We solve the model with these changes in parameter values and obtain country-specific estimates for CO 2 emissions. These estimates deviate from the CO 2 emissions profile in the CW baseline by changes in the fossil fuel supplies from the rest of the world. We therefore include a second step in the calibration procedure where we scale the non-electric AEEI factors to reduce energy demands and, hence, CO 2 emissions. The scaling takes place country by country to match the model as close as possible to the CW emissions profiles. We solve the model again to verify that it represents the CW baseline as an equilibrium solution. Finally, we use the equilibrium prices to calibrate the fossil fuel production functions to a price elasticity of supply equal to one. Electricity  36  43  31  30  12  38  23  30  Energy production  3  2  6  5  5  5  5  4  Industry  20  11  21  20  23  14  24  20  Transport  17  26  32  25  34  24  26  24  Final demand  24  17  10  20  26  19  22  21  Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 Note: The Rest of the European Union (REU) includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Table 5 explains the other region acronyms.
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